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EU-COUNTRY AND NON-EU-COUNTRY AT THE TIME OF CRISIS: 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT*
Helga Kristjánsdóttir1, Stefanía Óskarsdóttir2
Abstract. The global financial crisis affected the flows of foreign direct investment (FDI). This study focuses on two 
countries in the midst of the financial crisis: Iceland with IMF backup, and Ireland with ECB backup. The research 
focus is on the situation from the broad perspective of international economics and political atmosphere, combining 
government decisions with economic consequences. We analyze inward foreign direct investment, incorporating 
factors like economic size and stock market firms, receiving portfolio investment, rather than FDI. Our findings 
indicate that before the crisis the economic wealth in the domestic market to have positive effects on FDI, and firms 
receiving portfolio investment on the stock market are competing with FDI. This is the case for both Ireland and 
Iceland. However, after the crisis, these factors have insignificant impact on FDI.
Key words: European Union, EFTA, Ireland, Iceland, Global Financial Crisis, International Trade, Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI).
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1. Introduction
“The song of Ice and Ire” was the International Monetary 
Fund (2020) presentation title by the Nobel Prize 
winner Paul Krugman (2011), discussing the European 
Union (2020), the European Central Bank (2020), 
the International Monetary Fund (2018), as well as 
the EU-country Ireland (European Union, 2020), and 
the NON-EU-country Iceland (European Free Trade 
Association, 2020). 
At the time of the economic crash, Ireland had the 
Euro – but Iceland did not. Ireland had the European 
Central Bank (ECB) as the lender of last resort, and 
Iceland sought help from the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF Survey, 2015). During the crisis, public 
debt in Iceland surged up to 95% of GDP, and IMF 
imposed capital controls in Iceland providing an 
intensive rescue program “The IMF-supported program 
of $2.1 billion remains among the largest relative to the 
size of the economy – 18 percent of Iceland's GDP, or 
1,190 percent of Iceland's quota in the IMF” (International 
Monetary Fund, 2018). How much did the backing 
of the ECB and the IMF matter in putting Ireland and 
Iceland on the path of recovery? Does it add legitimacy 
that helps with political stability, or at least the 
perception of it? This current research seeks to answer 
these questions along the lines of previous research 
(Davies and Kristjánsdóttir, 2010; Davies, Ionascu and 
Kristjánsdóttir, 2008). The objective of this research is 
to focus on the impact of the financial crisis on Iceland 
and Ireland, Ireland with ECB backup, and Iceland 
with IMF backup. We look into the implication of the 
EU membership, considering Ireland and Iceland. The 
issue of individual country endowments is also relevant 
in the discussion of economic recovery, which country 
is more attractive for foreign direct investment (FDI) 
as reflection on the confidence of the global economic 
and political community in the countries; we measure 
FDI to the two countries applying trade modelling 
(Bergstrand 1985; Carr Markusen and Maskus 2001; 
Markusen 2004).
Two economies went through extreme economic 
crashes (International Monetary Fund, 2018), being no 
strangers to difficult economic conditions throughout 
history. This has tested their tolerance and shaped 
their cultures (Hofstede, 1980, 2001; Kristjánsdóttir, 
2016a, 2019a, 2020; Kristjánsdóttir, Guðlaugsson, 
Guðmundsdóttir and Aðalsteinsson, 2017, 2020) 
accounted for empirically in this research. After World 
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War I and World War II, Iceland and Ireland have 
remained primarily based economies with limited 
economic diversification, relying on agriculture 
and fisheries.  FDI has not been a significant factor 
for either country for very long. Measurement only 
started in the 1970s (IMF, 2016), giving a chance to 
explore a maturing market from birth to present. Small 
economies like these are only in few different sectors 
(Krugman, 2011), so it is easier to get a picture on what 
the major economic players are for each country. 
Iceland is geographically more distant (Distance 
Calculator, 2020) from the European mainland, and 
distances itself more by not having the EU membership 
or the Euro. The last fact may actually have helped 
Iceland in adjusting itself better to the current economic 
situation. Our data account for the EU membership, 
and we seek to analyze whether the EU or non-EU 
membership affect the way these countries tackle crisis. 
This paper focuses on Iceland and Ireland, providing 
analysis on the impact of the financial crisis. Both 
have small domestic markets and are therefore highly 
dependent on foreign trade and investment, Ireland 
has EU membership, Iceland is not a member country. 
Has the EU turned out to be a partnership for success, 
helping countries in their time of need, or is it imposing 
needlessly harsh rules that in actuality restrict the 
ability of a struggling nation to find its own way back to 
prosperity?
Now that we have established some potential factors 
for research, the question becomes, how did the global 
economic crisis affect FDI in two different countries? To 
answer that, the analysis includes variables accounting 
for political instability and government reaction 
(Kristjánsdóttir, 2016b). How did these countries work 
it out, and what might come next? What can we take 
away from the experience of these countries in the past 
decade, which can be used to make a more informed 
decision about the future? 
We study FDI in Ireland and Iceland, considering 
(Everett, Kelly and Mccann, 2015; Blonigen, Davies, 
and Waddell, 2007) finding conventional explanation 
for FDI and spatial interdependence to be affected by 
the choice of sample countries.  Our application of 
data in the model is similar to Davies (2008).  Earlier 
studies indicate that FDI flows from the United States 
increased as result of the formation of the European 
Community.  Some recent studies give mixed results 
(Hoeller, Girouard and Colecchia, 1998). 
2. Model Setup
Our estimation for Iceland and Ireland involves usage 
of other variables, introduced in Table 1.
3. Data  
Total of 25 European countries are accounted for in 
this current research, these are: Austria, Belgium, the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom.
Data runs from 1990 through 2010, and covers 
investment from individual countries to Iceland and 
Ireland in particular years.  We apply foreign direct 
investment, inward position (FDI) data from OECD 
(2020). These are FDI series of BOP and IIP aggregates, 
inward position at year-end in millions USD. The FDI 
data application here is in similar manner as data 
application in previous research (Kristjánsdóttir, 2010, 
2012b, 2013, 2017, 2019b).
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (BoP, current 
USD). Obtained from World Bank (2020). Foreign 
direct investment are the net inflows of investment 
to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent 
or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in 
an economy other than that of the investor. It is the 
sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other 
long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in 




FDI series of BOP and IIP aggregates. Inward position at year-end USD, millions in host country (j), over time (t). 
OECD (2020).
Portfolio equity j,t 
Portfolio equity, net inflows (BoP, current US$):
Portfolio equity includes net inflows from equity securities other than those recorded as direct investment and including 
shares, stocks, depository receipts (American or global), and direct purchases of shares in local stock markets by foreign 
investors. Data are in current USD. World Bank (2020).
trade j,t Merchandise trade (% of GDP). World Bank (2020).
nr of firms j,t Listed domestic companies on the host country stock market, total. World Bank (2020). 
GDP j,t Gross domestic product (GDP) current USD, in host country (j). Running over time (t). World Bank (2020).
gov pol j,t
Adaptability of government policy to changes in the economy is high (IMD WCY executive survey based on an index 
from 0 to 10). IMD (2020).
trans j,t
Transparency of government policy is satisfactory (Updated: May 2011, IMD WCY executive survey based on an index 
from 0 to 10). IMD (2020).
risk premium j,t Risk premium on lending (lending rate minus treasury bill rate, %). World Bank (2020).
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(new investment inflows less disinvestment) in the 
reporting economy from foreign investors. Data are in 
current USD.
Portfolio equity, net inflows (BoP, current USD) are 
obtained from World Bank (2019). Portfolio equity 
includes net inflows from equity securities other than 
those recorded as direct investment and including 
shares, stocks, depository receipts (American or global), 
and direct purchases of shares in local stock markets by 
foreign investors. Data are in current USD.
Merchandise trade (percentage of GDP). Merchan-
dise trade as a share of GDP is the sum of merchandise 
exports and imports divided by the value of GDP, all in 
current USD World Bank (2020). 
Listed domestic companies are the domestically 
incorporated companies listed on the country’s stock 
exchanges at the end of the year. This indicator does not 
include investment companies, mutual funds, or other 
collective investment vehicles. Data is from the World 
Bank (2020).
Risk premium on lending (lending rate minus 
Treasury bill rate, %). Risk premium on lending is 
the interest rate charged by banks on loans to private 
sector customers minus the “risk free” Treasury 
bill interest rate at which short-term government 
securities are issued or traded in the market. In some 
countries this spread may be negative, indicating 
that the market considers its best corporate clients 
to be lower risk than the government. The terms and 
conditions attached to lending rates differ by country, 
however, limiting their comparability. Risk premium 
data is from the World Bank (2020) not reported by 
the following countries: Austria, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, Luxembourg, Norway, and the Slovak 
Republic.
Adaptability of government policy to changes in the 
economy is high (IMD WCY executive survey based on 
an index from zero to 10), IMD data (2020).
Transparency of government policy is satisfactory 
(IMD WCY executive survey based on an index from 
zero to 10), IMD data (2020).
The data on the gross domestic product (GDP) 
measure comes from the World Bank (2020). Gross 
domestic product reported in GDP current USD. 
4. Regression results
We present regression results in Table 2 for both 
Iceland and Ireland before and after the crisis.
1990-2007 ICELAND estimates: GDP has 
significant positive effects on FDI stock, as well as 
transparency of government policy. However, it is 
significantly negatively affected by the number of firms 
and the risk premium. Trade and government policy 
do not have significant effects on FDI. 
2008-2010 ICELAND estimates: Trade, number 
of firms, GDP, government policy, transparency, and 
risk premium do not significantly affect FDI. 
1990-2007 IRELAND estimates: GDP has positive 
effects on FDI. Number of firms has negative effects 
on FDI stocks. However, trade, government policy, 
transparency of government policy, and risk premium 
do not have significant effects on FDI. 
2008-2010 IRELAND estimates: Trade, number of 
firms, GDP, government policy, transparency, and risk 
premium do not have significant effects on FDI.
Table 2
Determinants of FDI in Iceland and Ireland
1990-2007 ICELAND 2008-2010 ICELAND 1990-2007 IRELAND 2008-2010 IRELAND






























































R-sq 0.734 0.651 0.088 0.353
Obs 64 23 63 19 
Robust t-statistics reported in parentheses. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
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5. Summary and conclusions
The objective of this research is to capture how 
Iceland and Ireland were affected by the global financial 
crisis. To capture this, we analyze the foreign direct 
investment (FDI) going into Iceland and Ireland, before 
and after the crisis.
We find that only in the period before the crisis, 
both in Ireland and Iceland,  economic wealth in 
the domestic market have positive effects on FDI, 
however the number of listed firms to have negative 
effects on FDI. This indicates that before the 
crisis, investment to go to these countries based on 
growth and prosperity in the economy, making them 
attractive to foreigners. However, after the crisis the 
economic slowdown makes them less feasible for 
foreign direct investment, making economic wealth 
insignificant for FDI. 
Moreover, we find number of listed firms in the stock 
market to have negative effect on FDI before the crisis 
in both countries. This indicates that the more the stock 
market grows with portfolio investment, the less FDI, 
which is understandable. However, after the crisis, these 
effects are insignificant, and FDI is not competing with 
portfolio investment anymore. In addition, before the 
crisis GDP and transparency have positive effects for 
Iceland, but risk premium negative effects. After the 
crisis, the financial factors applied do not have any 
effects in either Ireland or Iceland. 
Overall estimates indicate when analyzing FDI in 
Ireland and Iceland, there is only competition between 
portfolio investment and foreign direct investment 
before the crisis, not after. In addition, the economic 
wealth only made FDI attracting before the crisis, not 
after the crisis.
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